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Abstract—This paper reports on the design and comparison
of two economically inspired mechanisms for task allocation in
environments where sellers have ﬁnite production capacities and
a cost structure composed of a ﬁxed overhead cost and a constant
marginal cost. Such mechanisms are required when a system
consists of multiple self-interested stakeholders that each possess
private information that is relevant to solving a systemwide prob-
lem. Against this background, we ﬁrst develop a computationally
tractable centralized mechanism that ﬁnds the set of producers
that have the lowest total cost in providing a certain demand
(i.e., it is efﬁcient). We achieve this by extending the standard
Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism to allow for multiattribute
bids and by introducing a novel penalty scheme such that pro-
ducers are incentivized to truthfully report their capacities and
their costs. Furthermore, our extended mechanism is able to
handle sellers’ uncertainty about their production capacity and
ensures that individual agents ﬁnd it proﬁtable to participate in
the mechanism. However, since this ﬁrst mechanism is centralized,
we also develop a complementary decentralized mechanism based
around the continuous double auction. Again, because of the
characteristics of our domain, we need to extend the standard
form of this protocol by introducing a novel clearing rule based
around an order book. With this modiﬁed protocol, we empirically
demonstrate (with simple trading strategies) that the mechanism
achieves high efﬁciency. In particular, despite this simplicity, the
traders can still derive a proﬁt from the market which makes our
mechanism attractive since these results are a likely lower bound
on their expected returns.
Index Terms—Decision theory, distributed decision making,
market-based control (MBC), multiagent systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
T
ASK allocation is an important and challenging problem
forcomputerscience(see[5]and[36]foranoverview).To
this end, in this paper, we speciﬁcally consider it in the context
of assigning tasks to a set of autonomous software agents. Now,
when a designer has complete control over both the agents
and the way in which they interact, an inherently cooperative
approach can be developed whereby the agents work together
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for the common good according to algorithms speciﬁed by
the designer in order to ﬁnd a system-wide solution [7], [20].
Moreover, when the agents participating in the system are
only concerned about the effectiveness of the overall system,
planning, distributed constraint optimization, and scheduling
algorithms have also been proposed [1], [10], [23], [31], [46].
However, such methods fail in systems where the agents
represent distinct stakeholders whose aim is to maximize their
own proﬁt in the system (e.g., in Grid computing where the
agents represent end users and e-commerce scenarios such
as e-Bay and electronic markets where agents represent the
buyers and sellers). They would fail because they present
the opportunity for the agent to gain an advantage by misre-
porting their position (either their needs or their resources).
For example, an agent might overreport its need for memory
capacity on a computational grid so that when the distributed
constraint optimization process is carried out, it gets allocated
more memory than its share in an efﬁcient allocation. Another
example is in peer-to-peer systems where the case of free-
riding (i.e., where agents understate their available resource
so as not to be asked to contribute to the system) has been
well documented [2]. Moreover, it can only be assumed that
if they could obtain such beneﬁt they would do so since the
agents are self-interested, rational problem solvers. Against this
background, market-based techniques are attractive because
their point of departure is developing protocols that achieve
good systemwide properties despite the fact that the agents act
selﬁshly [5]. Speciﬁcally, market-based control (MBC) is con-
cerned with using technologies and metaphors from economics
to develop effective task and resource allocation systems that
operate in a robust and decentralized manner [5]. To date, such
techniques have been shown to have great potential in do-
mains such as grid computing [44], peer-to-peer systems [39],
multirobot coordination [15], and mobile computing [4], but
have typically looked at standard cost functions and do not
provide a comparison between the two main strands of MBC:
namely, centralized and decentralized auctions.
In more detail, the aim of this paper is to consider the
use of these market mechanisms in cases where the agents
that are trying to sell the goods/resources (or provide ser-
vices/tasks) have a particular form of cost structure (consisting
of a ﬁxed overhead cost and a constant marginal cost) and
ﬁnite production capacities (which are both privately known
to them). We believe that these traits are typical of many
real-world applications such as electricity markets, job-shop
scheduling, and grid computing applications. For example, a
power plant will typically have a ﬁxed startup cost and a
constant marginal cost of running the plant up to its maximum
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capacity. The classic job-shop scheduling problem consists of
running periods composed of an initial machine setup time
(overhead cost) plus a cost per unit time (the marginal cost) and
a ﬁnite capacity which these machines can run up to. Finally,
agents providing computational resources on the grid incur
an overhead cost (computational cost of setting up the agent
managing the resource on the machine) and marginal costs as
they accept tasks up to the limit that their machines can support.
In general, there are two broad classes of market mechanisms
that can be considered when dealing with such problems.
The ﬁrst class, the reverse auction, involves a centralized
mechanism in which sellers report their values to a center
(that has already aggregated the demand from the buyers)
which then decides on the optimal allocation and the pay-
ments. The most popular of the centralized mechanisms is
the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism.1 Its popularity
arises from two attractive economic properties: it is allocatively
efﬁcient (i.e., it guarantees an efﬁcient solution in terms of ﬁnd-
ing the cheapest set of sellers that satisﬁes the demand), and it
is individually rational (i.e., it ensures that the agents are better
off joining the mechanism rather than opting out of it) [8], [25].
Unfortunately, in our case, the ﬁnite capacities of the sellers and
the particular cost structure of our problem mean that the VCG
no longer preserves these desirable economic properties. Thus,
we need toextend the VCGmechanism inorder torestorethem.
Such modiﬁcation is important because we wish to guarantee
that we ﬁnd the cheapest providers, and we want to ensure that
participants willingly join the system. Here, we achieve these
dual objectives by allowing agents to report on the triples (ﬁxed
cost, unit cost, and capacity) that characterize their types and
via the use of a novel penalty scheme (detailed in Section IV).
We prove that the ensuing mechanism is strategy-proof (i.e.,
every agent ﬁnds it in its best interest to truthfully reveal
its private information) and robust to sellers being uncertain
about their production capacity.2 Furthermore, we show that
the mechanism is computationally tractable since the optimal
allocation can be computed in pseudopolynomial time via the
use of a dynamic programming solution.
However, a potential drawback of our modiﬁed VCG mech-
anism (indeed of all the mechanisms in this class) is that it is
inherently centralized. That is, the task allocation is computed
by a single entity, the auctioneer, who does so by collecting
all the private information about the costs and capacities from
the various agents. Now, in some cases, this is not a prob-
lem, and the optimality of the mechanism is the overriding
concern. However, in other cases, issues such as robustness to
a single point of failure and scaleability are more important,
and this gives rise to the desire for decentralized mechanisms
[8]. Thus, to cope with this situation, we also consider the
1It should be noted that before the reverse auction is conducted all infor-
mation about the agents’ costs are held privately by the individual agents
themselves (and thus it is informationally decentralized) [25]. However, the
operation of these mechanisms involves an agent that collects all information
and performs a centralized computation.
2In certain scenarios, sellers may be uncertain about their capacity and would
only have a best estimate of that capacity (e.g., in power generation scenarios
a wind farm’s capacity will depend on the strength of the wind and in a job-
shop scheduling context the capacity of a machine might degrade stochastically
over time).
second broad class of MBC mechanism that can be employed
for the task/resource allocation problem: the continuous double
auction (CDA) [13], [40]. In this protocol, buyers and sellers
continuously submit bids (an offer to buy at price pb) and asks
(an offer to sell at price pa), respectively, (which are listed on
a billboard), and the market clears (i.e., a transaction occurs)
whenever the bid of a buyer matches the ask of a seller (i.e.,
when pb ≥ pa). Such an auction is decentralized in that the
allocation of the tasks is not computed by any single agent,
but rather emerges out of the interactions of the agents in
the protocol.3 Nevertheless, despite this decentralization, CDAs
still produce solutions that are very close to the optimal, even
when the participants adopt very simple strategies.4
However, most work on CDAs assumes a cost structure that
consists of a ﬁxed marginal cost for each unit supplied and no
startup cost. This choice of cost structure is quite natural in
macroeconomic models, and it results both in an equilibrium
market price (a unique price at which buyers and sellers agree
to trade) for the commodity and in efﬁcient allocations [25].
Unfortunately, the particular cost structure of our domain im-
plies that no such equilibrium exists. This is due to the average
unit cost of producing lower quantities is greater than that when
producing larger quantities as a result of the startup cost (this is
akin to models where there are economies of scale in which the
startup cost is shared over a greater product run [25]). The pres-
ence of a capacity constraint further complicates matters since,
in general, a single seller will not be able to fully satisfy the
total demand. Furthermore, since we are developing a protocol
for task allocation, we consider buyers with inelastic demand
(i.e.,buyersdonotvarytheirdemandaccordingtoprice)which,
in turn, means that the CDA is focused on ﬁnding the cheapest
set of seller(s) given an exact demand from the buyers.5 Given
these points, we need to modify the standard CDA mechanism
by designing suitable clearing rules and constraining the type
of offers allowed in the market in order to deal with the
aforementioned issues. We then assess the allocative efﬁciency
of our market mechanism using the same methodology as was
employed by Gode and Sunder in their seminal study of the
standard CDA mechanism6 [18]. This assessment shows that
the allocative efﬁciency of our CDA protocol is fairly high
(with an average value of 83% in the scenario we consider)
and that our zero-intelligence (ZI2) agents are always proﬁtable
3Even the seemingly centralized billboard in the CDA can be implemented
using a broadcast communication protocol that mimics the typical “shouts” in
the original trading pit [13].
4In this context, a strategy is simply a method of generating a bid or an ask
given the observed current market conditions. In CDAs, it has been shown that a
strategy that randomly generates bids/asks between a set lower and upper bound
can be extremely efﬁcient (both for the individual participant and in terms
of the effectiveness of the overall market). Such strategies are known as ZI
strategies [18].
5Inelastic demand also ensures a fair comparison with the centralized case.
This is because allowing for elastic demand will result in an allocation which
satisﬁes a demand deﬁned by the demand and supply curves rather than a prior
demand that has been made by the buyers (which would occur with inelastic
demand). It also allows us to characterize the cost of decentralizing the market-
based mechanism in terms of its efﬁciency loss.
6While their study employed ZI agents that operate purely on price, in our
case, the sellers have to provide both a price and quantity vector. Thus, we
modify the ZI strategy to a ZI2 strategy that applies the same basic idea to both
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(this condition is broadly equivalent to the individual rationality
condition of the centralized mechanism).
These two mechanisms have been developed because they
represent complementary task allocation mechanisms for the
same domain (i.e., where the sellers have ﬁnite production
capacity and the cost structure we outline). Thus, while the
extended VCG mechanism guarantees that the cheapest set
of seller(s) is always found, it is centralized. In contrast, the
mechanism derived from the CDA is decentralized, but it does
not guarantee to ﬁnd the cheapest set of sellers. Thus, in
some cases, the centralized mechanism is more appropriate
because efﬁciency cannot be compromised (e.g., when the costs
involved are high or the set of agents participating in the market
is low, thereby abating the disadvantages of centralization).
However, when decentralization is a more desirable aspect
(such as in cases where there are large numbers of agents
or when robustness to failure is important), the CDA-based
solution is more appropriate. Furthermore, our experimental
results quantify the loss in efﬁciency that occurs when the
decentralized system is implemented instead of its centralized
counterpart (an average of 17% in the case we study). It is
important to note that under both mechanisms, the sellers,
although competitive, are proﬁtable and they are hence always
incentivized to participate in our systems.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II presents the main related work in this area. In
SectionIII,wethenpresentourbasicmodelofthecoststructure
we are considering. We explain in Section III why a simple
extension of the VCG mechanism would not work via the use
of an example. In Section IV, we detail our centralized mech-
anism and prove its economic and computational properties. In
Section V, we present our decentralized protocol and empiri-
cally evaluate its properties. We conclude and suggest areas of
future work in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
The VCG mechanism and its various extensions have been
used in a variety of computer systems for task allocation situa-
tions. The two broad issues that have been investigated are the
economic and computational properties of these mechanisms
under various scenarios (e.g., [22], [29], [32], [33], [38], and
[41]). Most solutions in this area consider standard demand
functions (not our cost structure) in order to derive approximate
solutions to the problem or to ﬁnd instances where these can be
solved exactly in polynomial time [35].
However, recently, there has been increasing interest on the
economic and computational properties of mechanisms using
nonstandard cost functions. In particular, a decreasing marginal
cost structure has been considered in [21] and a polynomially
solvable, approximately strategy-proof and approximately efﬁ-
cient (i.e., solutions which are within a bound of the optimal)
auction mechanism has been devised. In addition, more general
piecewise linear continuous curves have been considered in
[11], but the incentives for truthful bidding were not taken
into account. Furthermore, in [16] and [37], more realistic cost
curves such as those related to volume–quantity discounts are
considered and expressed using particular bidding languages
(which express variations on XOR and AND bids) have been
investigated. However, none of these approaches would work
for the cost structure of our domain since they do not consider
both the economic and computational properties of problems
with overhead cost, constant marginal cost and limited capacity
simultaneously. Furthermore, unlike this paper, they do not
derive an efﬁcient, strategy-proof, and individually rational
solution or compare it with a decentralized auction. Also, they
do not consider the problem of suppliers not fulﬁlling their
commitment. This latter problem is studied in [9] and [30].
However, the mechanism in [30] considers success and failure
as a binary variable and thus does not try to incentivize agents
to produce up to their maximum if ever they cannot fulﬁl their
commitment. In [9], both the producers and consumers report
over the success of a transaction and thus their mechanism
is more appropriate in an iterated market place where the
consumers can form an opinion about the success rate of each
producers. As a result, in their case, the consumers bear the risk
of correctly evaluating the success rate of a producer, unlike
in our mechanism where it is up to the producers to correctly
estimate their capacities.
The double auction class of market mechanism consists
fundamentally of two categories: the clearing-house and the
CDA. The former involves all bids and asks being submitted
to an auctioneer and the market being cleared periodically by
that auctioneer (who calculates the allocation). In contrast, the
latter clears continuously, with the competition in the market
decidingtheallocationratherthananauctioneer. Inthiscontext,
one particularly relevant application of the double auction is
by Nicolaisen et al. [27] in a wholesale electricity market.
Speciﬁcally, they use a clearing-house double auction with
discriminatory pricing. Now, while they do not look at the com-
plexity involved with a cost structure, they do describe a market
mechanism for resource allocation. In particular, the agents
populating their markets adopt a sophisticated bidding behavior
(a modiﬁed Roth–Erev reinforcement learning algorithm [34]),
and they evaluate the efﬁciency of their mechanism using such
strategies. Other relevant works on the double auction include
that by McCabe et al. [26] on the design of a clearing-house,
and Xia et al. [45] on solving combinatorial double auction
mechanisms. However, these mechanisms are not decentralized
like the CDA since they involve an auctioneer who computes
the allocation and prices.
Speaking more generally, most research on the CDA has
been on the structure and behavior of the mechanism. Indeed,
the initial stimulation for this paper comes from the ﬁeld of
experimental economics where experiments with human vol-
unteers showed that small groups of traders could quickly ﬁnd
the equilibrium price in simulated single commodity markets
[18],[40].Inlinewiththisseminalwork,many researchersthen
extended these simple trading strategies to generate sophisti-
cated software agents that are capable of observing the trading
behaviorofotheragentsinordertolearnthemarketequilibrium
price of a commodity, and thus trade more efﬁciently [17],
[19], [42], [43]. However, in all of this paper, the existence
of the market equilibrium at which both buyers and sellers
seek to trade is a consequence of the assumption of a cost
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Unfortunately, the cost structure of our domain destroys this
market equilibrium and thus the close to optimal efﬁciency
usually obtained by CDAs cannot be guaranteed. Speciﬁcally,
this is because the different startup costs and the inelastic
demand mean that a single price on which buyers and sellers
agree to trade cannot be reached. To remedy this, we develop a
variant of the CDA that is still reasonably efﬁcient, but that can
deal with the speciﬁc cost structure and capacity constraint in
our domain.
III. ALLOCATION PROBLEM
We now discuss in more detail the problem structure that we
consider in the remainder of this paper. The system which we
wish to control consists of a set I = {1,...,n} of n suppliers
of a resource and a number of consumers with total demand D.
Each supplier i ∈Iis characterized by a maximum capacity
that it can provide ci and a cost function Ci. The cost function
is deﬁned as a combination of a ﬁxed price fi payable for any
amount of production and a separate per unit price ui
Ci =
 
0, if x =0
fi + xiui, if 0 <x i ≤ ci
(1)
where xi is the quantity of production allocated to seller Si.
Thus, an allocation vector x ∈X is one in which each agent
Si is asked to supply a quantity xi. We assume that both the de-
mand and the details of the cost function are private information
of the producers (also referred to as suppliers or sellers) since
they represent distinct self-interested stakeholders. Given this,
the overall aim of the system is to satisfy the total demand by
allocating production between the different producers. Here, we
assume that the resource is bought and sold in small indivisible
units (as is common in most billing systems) and thus xi ∈ N.
As the designer of the whole system, we are interested in
ensuring that the overall allocation, x∗, of the resource under
consideration is optimum in the sense that it minimizes the total
cost of production. In this case, it is an optimization problem
where we minimize the sum of the individual production costs,
while satisfying the total demand,
 
i xi = D, and the capacity
constraints of each individual producer
x∗ = argmin
x
 
i
(αifi + uixi) (2)
such that 0 ≤ xi ≤ ci and where
αi =
 
0, if xi =0
1, otherwise.
The problem as described here is similar to two stan-
dard problems from the literature of operational research and
scheduling; speciﬁcally, the knapsack problem [24] and the
capacitated lot-size problem [3]. Comparing this problem to the
knapsack problem, we note that we can consider each supplier
to be an item to be ﬁtted into a knapsack. The size and value
of each of these items is represented by the number of units of
production allocated to this supplier and the cost of producing
this allocation. Unlike the standard knapsack problem, where
we seek to maximize the value of items without exceeding
the size of the knapsack, our goal here is to exactly ﬁll the
knapsack (i.e., satisfy demand) while minimizing the value
of items placed inside (i.e., minimize the production costs).
Although we can place fractional items within the knapsack,
the size of these items is restricted to integer units of production
and the corresponding value of the item is given by the cost
structure shown in (1).
Comparing to the standard capacitated lot-size problem,
which attempts to schedule the production of a single producer
over a number of days to meet a speciﬁc daily demand, we
are attempting to schedule production over a number of dif-
ferent producers to satisfy an aggregate demand. Despite this
difference, both problems share a similar cost structure, most
speciﬁcally the combination of a ﬁxed and per-unit cost, and
most importantly, both models share the concept of producers
who have a constrained production capacity. We could thus
adapt algorithms developed for the capacitated lot-size problem
to our problem. However, in this paper, the goal is to show that
theproblemcanbesolvedinacomputationallyefﬁcientmanner
rather than solve the problem in the most computationally
efﬁcient manner.
Now,boththeknapsackandthecapacitatedlot-sizeproblems
have been shown to be NP-hard [12], [14]. However, both can
be solved in pseudopolynomial time using a dynamic program-
ming approach [14], and we present a suitable implementation
of this technique for our speciﬁc problem in Section IV-C.
Given this problem description, in the following sections, we
describe our two task allocation mechanisms, starting with the
centralized one.
IV. CENTRALIZED MECHANISM
Our centralized mechanism builds upon the standard VCG
mechanism since this mechanism has a number of desirable
economic properties with respect to task allocation (as outlined
in Section I). Speciﬁcally, it is efﬁcient, incentivizes the agents
to reveal their costs truthfully to the auctioneer in dominant
strategy (i.e., an agent ﬁnds no better option than to reveal
its costs truthfully) and guarantees a nonnegative utility to the
participating agents.
The standard VCG mechanism for task allocation represents
the producers as agents participating in a reverse auction to
satisfy the demand of the auctioneer. The agents submit their
respective private information about their costs, known as their
types θi in sealed bids to the auctioneer. After this stage, the
auctioneer ﬁnds the efﬁcient allocation and then calculates the
transfers (i.e., the amount of money that is to be paid to each
agent). It is this transfer scheme that results in the agents having
truthful reporting as a dominant strategy.
However, there are two key differences between our setting
and that of a standard VCG mechanism. First, each agent’s type
has three dimensions that characterize its cost function instead
of the usual one. Speciﬁcally, these dimensions are the ﬁxed
price or setup cost fi, the unit cost ui, and the capacity ci.
Second,thecapacityoftheagentdoesnotdirectlyimpactonthe
cost of supplying an allocated quantity of a resource, but rather
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the standard setting of a VCG where an agent’s type directly
impacts on its cost. Thus, an agent overstating its capacity does
not change its payment in the traditional VCG mechanism (as
we show in Section IV-A), but does change the efﬁcient set of
suppliers calculated by the center.
To deal with these differences, the standard VCG needs to
be extended in three ways. The ﬁrst change is to have agents
report the attributes that deﬁne their cost functions rather than
a single cost price. The second change is to have a separate
allocation and payment phase (as opposed to the traditional
VCG mechanism where this is amalgamated into a single
phase) since it is the very reports of the agents (i.e., that of
their capacities) which deﬁne the space of feasible allocations.
The third change is the introduction of a penalty scheme that
incentivizes the agents to report truthfully on their capacities.7
Given this, we present the payment as a two-part scheme:
a transfer scheme and a penalty scheme (presented in
Sections IV-A and B). This two-part mechanism is presented
for explanatory purposes only and the overall combined mech-
anism is presented in Section IV-C. In Section IV-D, we prove
the economic and computational properties of our mechanism.
A. Transfer Scheme
The allocation problem is the same as that introduced in
Section III. If the agents are incentivized to report truthfully,
then the auctioneer can just take their reports and solve the
optimization problem introduced in Section III. More generally,
however, agents might not report their types truthfully if they
believe that they will derive a higher proﬁt by lying. Thus, if
agents report   θi =(  fi,   ui,   ci), the auctioneer then solves
x∗ = argmin
x
 
i
(αi  fi +   uixi) (3)
such that 0 ≤ xi ≤   ci and where
αi =
 
0, if xi =0
1, otherwise.
Hence, comparing (2) and (3) in order to achieve an efﬁcient
allocation, we are left with the problem of incentivizing the
agents to report truthfully. If we assume rational self-interested
agents, then this implies that they should maximize their own
utility when reporting truthfully (otherwise they will lie!). As
with most other work in this area, we consider the case that the
agents have a quasi-linear utility function8 [25].
7We should note here that the second difference does not result in interde-
pendent valuations (i.e., valuations which depend on other agents’ observed
signals). While the capacity of each agent does change the allocation of other
agents (the cheapest agent will determine how much the remaining agents will
obtain via its capacity), it only does so in an indirect way. Therefore, we can
still aim to achieve an efﬁcient mechanism despite the multidimensionality of
the types since we are ﬁrmly in the realm of private values [22].
8The quasi-linear utility function is a characteristic of a standard VCG
mechanism and is required so as to circumvent the Gibbard–Satterthwite
impossibilityresultaboutachievingefﬁciencyinasettingthatconsidersgeneral
utility functions (i.e., non-quasi-linear ones) [25].
TABLE I
SET OF THREE PRODUCERS BIDDING TO
SATISFY A DEMAND OF 200 UNITS
Deﬁnition 1—Quasi-Linear Utility Function: A quasi-linear
utility function is one that can be expressed as
Ui(x,t i,θ i)=ti − vi(x,θ i) (4)
where vi(x,θ i) is the cost of the allocation x to agent i given its
type θi and ti represents the transfer of money from the center
to agent i.
The standard VCG mechanism achieves truth-telling by
aligning the goal of each agent with that of the mechanism
designer. It does so by imposing a transfer on the agent which
is equivalent to its marginal contribution to the society. Now,
applying this insight to our multidimensional-type domain, we
advocate the following transfer scheme in which the agents
report on all three dimensions of their types [i.e., on θi =
(fi,u i,c i)]:
ti =

 min
x
xj ≤cj
 
j∈I\i
(α  fj +   ujxj)

 −


 
j∈I\i
 
α∗   fj +   uj   xj
∗
 


(5)
where   xj
∗ is the allocation to agent j in the optimal allocation
  x∗, calculated with the reports of all the agents. This scheme
is the only one that completely captures an agent’s marginal
contribution to the system and it is therefore the only possible
scheme that can be used in this context.
The transfer scheme of (5) consists of two parts. The ﬁrst
calculates the total cost of the optimal allocation if agent i were
not included in the set of suppliers. In the second part, ﬁrst the
optimal allocation with agent i is found and then the total cost
of this allocation is calculated minus the cost of this allocation
to agent i. Thus, the payment that i receives is its marginal
contribution to reducing the total cost of the optimal allocation.
It can be observed that i will always receive a nonnegative
payment since the addition of a seller will only decrease the
cost of the optimal allocation.
However, this is not the only change that is required to
incentivize the agents to report truthfully. We now present an
example which illustrates the need for an additional penalty
scheme. Consider a set of producers {1,...,n} with different
types who are participating in a reverse auction to fulﬁll a
demand of 200 units (i.e., D = 200). The producers’ types,
(i.e., θi =( ci,f i,u i)), are depicted in Table I. They report
their types to the auctioneer which then calculates the transfers
according to (3) and (5).
Let us suppose for now that the capacity ci of the agents are
known by the auctioneer. Then, implementing our mechanism
with the transfer described by (5), the auctioneer ﬁrst chooses
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150 units and S1 producing 50 units (i.e., x = {50,150,0})
thereby giving a total cost of 525 to the system. The transfers
would then be 220 to S1, 395 to S2,a n d0t oS3 (i.e., t =
{220,395,0}). However, giventhisscheme,S3 hasanincentive
to lie about its capacity and give a capacity greater than 200
(i.e.,   c3 ≥ 200). It would then be allocated to produce the
whole demand and would be paid 525 to do so. However, as
its true capacity is only 175 units, the demand will not be
satisﬁed.
Thus, from the above example, we can observe that an agent
has an incentive to report a higher capacity than it actually has.
However, an agent has no incentive to report a lower capacity.
This is because the utility derived by an agent is equal to its
marginal contribution to the society. Now, if an agent reports
a capacity lower than its actual one and this misreport has an
effect on the optimal allocation (i.e., the capacity it reports is
lower than the allocation it would have got under an optimal
allocation), then it increases the total cost to the society since
the minimization in (3) would have tighter constraints. This
would mean that the marginal contribution of the agent to
decreasing the total cost in the society is less and hence the
agent would derive a lower utility. We thus only need to worry
aboutagentsreportingahighercapacitythantheyactuallyhave.
We therefore impose a penalty scheme that incentivizes agents
to report truthfully about their capacity. In a standard VCG,
such a penalty scheme does not exist since it is assumed that
the producers have unlimited capacity. Furthermore, a penalty
scheme imposed after the agents have supplied their allocations
is the only way in which we can incentivize agents to report
truthfully about their capacity. This is because the auctioneer
will only know whether an agent has overstated its capacity
if ever that agent has been allocated to produce over its true
capacity(butunderitsdeclaredone)aftertheagenthassupplied
its allocation.
B. Penalty Scheme
We wish to penalize agents that report a higher capacity than
they actually have. However, we are not concerned with un-
truthful reporting if this does not change the resulting efﬁcient
allocation. This is because such agents will not derive a higher
utility if their untruthful reporting has not changed the efﬁcient
allocation. Thus, we will call agents whose reported capacity
changes the optimal outcome active agents.
For example in the allocation problem given in Table I, if
there was a supplier S4 with (c4,f 4,u 4) = (150,200,2), then
even if it lied and reported   c4 = 400, it would not make a
difference in our optimal allocation (since its cost of supplying
200 units is 550 and this is still greater than the efﬁcient
outcome calculated previously).
In order to know whether the active agents have truthfully
reported their capacity, we require a postproduction stage that
checks how much they actually produced. We shall assume
that if an agent is asked to supply a certain amount   xi
∗, and
actually produces only xi, (xi <   xi
∗), then the capacity of that
agent is xi. We shall see that given the penalty we design, this
assumption is satisﬁed with rational agents. It is only in the
case of malicious agents who want to increase the cost to the
system with no consideration to their own utility for which the
following penalty scheme would not work.
In more detail, we impose the following penalty pi if the
agent does not supply the amount that it was required to supply
under the optimal allocation (i.e., if xi <x ∗
i):
pi = ti(xi ≤   ci) − ti(xi ≤ xi)+δ (6)
where ti(xi ≤   ci) is the transfer in (5) computed with the
constraint xi ≤   ci, ti(xi ≤ xi) is the one computed with the
constraint xi ≤ xi and δ>0. Intuitively, the penalty scheme
ensures that an agent overstating its capacity would derive
strictly less utility than when it provided a truthful report by
making such an agent derive an overall transfer of ti(xi ≤
xi) − δ. Note that in the event that such an agent has misre-
ported so as to be in the active set, ti(xi ≤ xi) would then be
zero and thus that agent would derive a negative utility equal to
−δ since ti(xi ≤   ci) would also be removed from its utility.
This penalty scheme, which is a transfer of money from the
agent to the auctioneer, consists of three parts. The ﬁrst is the
transfer that occurs with the reported capacity   ci. The second
part is the transfer that would have resulted if the agent had
reported its capacity as the amount that it has successfully
supplied. This penalty scheme thus only penalizes agents in
the case where their misreported capacity has changed the
allocation of supply. The third part is the one that ensures that
the utility an agent derives from misreporting its capacity is
strictlylowerthanwhenittellsthetruth(i.e.,itisthenastrongly
dominant strategy for the agent to report its truthful capacity).
It should also be noted that although this penalty scheme
has been developed for the case of agents misreporting their
capacity, it would also penalize agents that have not produced
the speciﬁed amount due to other reasons. This penalty scheme
thus puts the onus on the agents to provide an accurate report of
the amount they can produce. The value of δ can thus be set by
the mechanism designer depending on how critical it is to meet
demand. The more critical the requirement, the higher δ should
be set. Evidently, this sacriﬁces efﬁciency (the agents report a
lower capacity than their most likely capacity) for robustness.
Another attractive aspect of this penalty scheme is that if ever
an agent realizes after the allocation that it cannot produce the
amount assigned to it, it would still produce until its limit so
as to reduce the ultimate penalty. This penalty scheme can also
be potentially coupled with a reputation mechanism such that
instead of having a δ which is uniform over all the agents,
each agent i could have a speciﬁc δi which the center tunes
according to past interactions with the agent (e.g., one could use
the simple trust model in [9] in order to model past interactions
and condition the penalties accordingly). Further details about
the actual calibration of δ when the system is designed for the
case in which agents are unsure about their capacity are given
in the Appendix.
Thus, in our example in Table I, if agent S3 reported   ci =
200, it would be penalized 525 + δ [from (6)]. As a result, the
agentdoesnotproﬁtbylying.Inthecaseofthetwootheragents
S1 and S2, misreporting their types, they incur a loss in utility
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C. Mechanism
We can amalgamate the two-part payment scheme presented
in Sections IV-A and B into an equivalent one-stage payment,
thus yielding the following centralized mechanism.
1) First, the seller agents Si provide reports of their types
  θi =(  fi,   ui,   ci) to the center.
2) The center, having gathered total demand from the buyer
agents, solves (3) and assigns production to the agents
according to the optimal allocation vector   x∗.
3) The center then provides the overall payment mi to the
agents once they have produced their allocation
mi =ti − pi
=ti(xi ≤ xi) − δβi (7)
where βi is a binary variable indicating when a supplier
has overreported its capacity and equals 1 when xi <   xi
∗.
D. Properties of the Mechanism
We now prove the properties of our mechanism. To this end:
Proposition 1: The mechanism is strategy-proof.
Proof: A mechanism is strategy-proof if it is a dominant
strategy for the players to reveal their types truthfully (i.e.,
stating their types truthfully is a best strategy for an agent no
matter what the type of the agent and no matter what strategy
the other agents follow). Here, we need to prove that truthful
reporting is a dominant strategy for the agents given the transfer
and penalty schemes in our mechanism. We ﬁrst consider the
case that the agent has not overreported its capacity. Then, its
strategy is to report   θ so as to maximize its utility
  θi =(  ui,   fi,   ci)
= arg max
  θi∈Θi
 
Ui(  θi),x
 
= arg max
  θi∈Θi
 
 
  αi
∗(  fi − fi)+(  ui − ui)  xi
∗
 
− min
x
xj ≤  cj
 
j∈I
(αj   fj +   ujxj)
+ min
x
xj ≤  cj
 
j∈I\i
(αj   fj +   ujxj)
 
=arg max
  θi∈Θi
  
  αi
∗(  fi − fi)+(  ui − ui)  xi
∗
 
− min
x
xj ≤  cj
 
j∈I
(αj   fj +   ujxj)
 
.
The ﬁrst part of the maximization is the gain or loss that an
agent makes by misreporting its type, whereas the second part
is the effect that this misreporting has on the allocation and the
global cost. Hence, any misreport on its type is canceled out by
the effect on the global cost. The important point to note here
is that the minimization is not carried out by the agent but by a
center that is only aware of   θi. Hence, in order to maximize the
term in [·] above, an agent should report   θi =( fi,u i,   ci). That
is, truthtelling in (fi,u i) is a weakly dominant strategy (it is
only weakly so because in certain cases an agent on lying would
derive a utility which is equivalent to what it derives if it told
the truth). Thus, we have proved that the mechanism is strategy-
proof in (fi,u i). Furthermore, we know that an agent will not
report a lower capacity (as per the discussion in Section IV-A).
Now, we prove that under the penalty scheme the agent will
not report a capacity higher than its actual one. The utility of an
agent i, given that it has reported a higher capacity, is the sum of
its cost, transfer, and penalty. We now prove that overreporting
its capacity is a weakly dominated strategy for an active agent
(i.e., overreporting one’s capacity is never better than stating
one’s capacity truthfully). From (4) and (7), the utility of an
agent would then be
Ui(·) = max
  θi∈Θi
  
  αi
∗(  fi − fi)+(  ui − ui)  xi
∗
 
− min
x
xj≤xj
 
j∈I
(αj   fj +   ujxj)
 
− δβ
< max
  θi∈Θi
 
 
  αi
∗(  fi − fi)+(  ui − ui)  xi
∗
 
− min
x
xj≤  cj
  ci=ci
 
j∈I
(αj   fj +   ujxj)
 
.
Thus, together with the fact that an agent would not report
a lower capacity (since such a report would mean that its
resulting allocation is less or equal to the one when it reports
truthfully), the above proves that an agent will always report
its truthful capacity ci. Hence, we have that the agent always
reports truthfully about its type θi. 
Proposition 2: The mechanism is efﬁcient.
This implies that the center ﬁnds the outcome given by (2).
Proof: The above is a result of the strategy-proofness of
the mechanism. Since the goal of the center is to achieve
efﬁciency, then given truthful reports, the center will achieve
efﬁciency. 
Proposition 3: The mechanism is individually rational.
A mechanism is individually rational if there is an incentive
for agents to join it rather than opting out of it. We begin by
assuming that the utility an agent derives from not joining the
mechanism is 0. Then, we need to prove that the utility an agent
derives in the mechanism is always ≥ 0.
Proof: Given the strategy-proofness of the mechanism,
the utility of an agent is
Ui(ui,f i,c i)=− min
x
xj≤cj
 
j∈I
(αjfj + ujxj)
+ min
x
xj≤cj
 
j∈I\i
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The ﬁrst minimization is over a larger set than the second one.
Thus
min
x
xj≤cj
 
j∈I
(αjfj + ujxj) ≤ min
x
xj≤cj
 
j∈I\i
(αfj + ujxj).
Hence, Ui(ui,f i,c i) ≥ 0. 
Proposition 4: The mechanism is robust to uncertainties
about the capacity of agents.
In this case, we impose less stringent information require-
ments on the agents when reporting their capacity. So far, we
have considered the case where prior to revealing its type an
agent is aware of its capacity. However, we believe that this
may not be always practical since the capacity of a supplier may
dependonnumerousexternalfactors(asdiscussedinSectionI).
Wethereforerelaxthisrequirement andconsider thecase where
an agent is aware of only the probability distribution function
(pdf) relating to its capacity. We next prove that the designer
can, via the setting of δ, force the agent to either report safe
values (i.e., the agent is nearly certain that it will produce at
least this capacity) or more risky but potentially more proﬁtable
ones.
Proof: We start by looking at the expected utility of an
agent given that the pdf of its capacity pdf(ci) ranges from a
lower bound ci to an upper bound ci
E [Ui(ci,f i,u i)] =E
 
min
x
xj≤  cj
 
j∈I\i
(αfj + ujxj)
− min
x
xj≤  cj
 
j∈I
(αjfj + ujxj) − δβi
 
= min
x
xj≤  cj
 
j∈I\i
(αfj + ujxj)
−
ci  
  ci
min
x
xj≤  cj
 
j∈I
(αjfj + ujxj)pdf(ci)dci
− δP(ci <   ci).
Now,letusanalyzehowthereportsoftheagentsimpactontheir
utility. The safest report is the minimum report ci. Reporting a
higher capacity would then yield a gain of
∆E[Ui(ci,f i,u i)] = −δP(ci<   ci)+
 
min
x
xj≤cj
 
j∈I
(αjfj+ujxj)
−
ci  
  ci
min
x
xj≤  cj
 
j∈I
(αjfj+ujxj)pdf(ci)dci
 
. (8)
The agents would then try to maximize the above gain given
a certain δ. Thus, the setting of δ would then depend on how
certain we want the agents to be about being able to satisfy their
capacity. Hence, given P(ci ≥   ci), setting δ as
δ =
 
min
x
xj≤cj
 
j∈I
(αjfj + ujxj)
− min
x
xj≤  cj
 
j∈I
(αjfj + ujxj)P(ci≥   ci)
  
(1−P(ci≥   ci))
results in no expected gain for the agent. In fact, from (8), if we
consider a ﬁxed δ, then as   ci increases, the part in [·] increases
while −δP(ci <   ci) decreases. Thus, there is a   ci for a ﬁxed δ
that results in a maximum gain. We can therefore conclude that
as δ increases,   ci → ci and as δ decreases,   ci → ci. 
The second part of the robustness is that even if the agent
realizes after reporting   ci that ci <   xi
∗ (and it is asked to
produce ci <x ∗
i ≤   ci), it will still produce up to ci as a result
of the payment and penalty scheme.
Proof: This is evident from the way the center pays the
agents. The agents get a higher utility with a higher production
since the transfer depends on how much they produce (i.e., x)
after the allocation. Speciﬁcally, consider an agent i that has
overestimated its capacity in such a way that it affects the
efﬁcient allocation (i.e., in the efﬁcient allocation calculated
by the center from the reported types ci <x ∗
i ≤   ci). Then, that
agent derives a utility of
Ui(·)=ti(xi ≤ xi) − fi − uixi − δ
= min
x
xj≤  cj
 
j∈I\ 
(αj   fj +   ujxj)
− min
x
xj≤  cj
ci=xi
 
j∈I
(αj   fj +   ujxj) − δ. (9)
Onlythesecondtermof(9)canbeaffectedbyagentivarying
its production amount xi. Since agent i wants to maximize its
utility, it would want this second term to be as small as possible
and therefore make xi as large as possible, which is achieved
by making xi = ci. 
So far, we have discussed the use of a uniform δ which is
chosen according to how critically demand has to be met. This
approach penalizes the agent during the current interaction.
An alternative approach to dealing with uncertainties in seller
capacity would be to instead penalize the agent overreporting
its capacity during future interaction. A possible way of imple-
menting this is via the use of a trust-based mechanism (TBM)
[9]. While detailing such a mechanism is outside the scope
of this paper, we provide in the appendix an intuitive expla-
nation on how such a mechanism would differ from the one
proposed here.
Proposition 5: The optimal task allocation to the agents can
be computed exactly by the center in pseudopolynomial time.
Proof: The center can calculate the task allocation to the
agents exactly using dynamic programming. Speciﬁcally, we
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Fig. 1. Pseudocode representing the dynamic programming solution to ﬁnd
the optimum centralized solution in pseudopolynomial time.
demand of D with access to n producers. This can be solved
using the recursive expressions
C[0,d]=
 
0, if d =0
∞, if d>0
C[i,d] =min
x
 
C[i − 1,d]
C[i − 1,d− x]+fi + xui
such that 0 <x≤ ci. As the production allocated to each
producer is in indivisible units, we can calculate C[n,D] by
evaluating all nD possible values. This results in an algorithm
which operates in pseudopolynomial time.
In particular, a simple algorithm for this solution is presented
in Fig. 1. Here, we calculate all the values of the array C[n,D]
starting from the known case C[0,0] = 0 and using the recur-
sive expressions above to calculate subsequent values. A more
efﬁcient solution may be found using primal-dual algorithms
[28]. However, for the size of problem tackled here, the above
solution is extremely efﬁcient. Moreover, the same approach
can then be used to calculate the resulting task allocation to
the agents. 
V. D ECENTRALIZED MECHANISM
So far, we have considered a centralized mechanism in order
to deal with our task allocation problem. However, as discussed
in Section I, we sometimes require a mechanism for task allo-
cation in which there is no center that governs the allocations.
Therefore, in this section, we consider the CDA as the second
class of MBC task allocation mechanism.
Our task allocation problem involves multiple suppliers and
multiple buyers, and the matching of the two is determined
by the sellers and buyers who successfully transact with one
another. As discussed in Sections I and II, the most common
CDA format assumes buyers and sellers have an increasing
marginal cost and no startup cost and the offers in the trade are
via price alone. However, in our case, the total production cost
depends on both the startup cost and the number of units to be
sold (given the marginal cost). In fact, since the startup cost is
distributed over the sale quantity, the cost price is not ﬁxed for
different numbers of units sold. As a result, the supplier cannot
ﬁrmly decide on an asking price (based on the production cost
per unit or cost price) that would allow it to be proﬁtable and to
participate in the task allocation (by transacting with potential
buyers). This is because the sale quantity cannot be known
ap r i o r i . To overcome this, we assume that it is possible for
the supplier to make a prediction about the amount of units it
expects to sell (since exact demand can only be estimated).9
Now, in traditional cost settings, a supplier can start making
bids for a low quantity and slowly ramp up his price so as to
ensure he does not make a loss. However, in our scenario, low
quantities correspond to higher unit prices. Thus, the supplier
is faced with the problem that reducing its price may not
guarantee that it transacts and in certain cases may lead to
a loss (if a buyer speciﬁes a demand such that the ask price
becomes lower than the cost price). We therefore allow sellers
to communicate the amount they wish to sell to the market via a
multidimensional bid consisting of both quantity and price. We
also specify in our clearing rules that a transaction only occurs
when a buyer makes a bid for this amount.
Given this background, a key objective for the decentral-
ized mechanism is to be individually rational (as deﬁned in
Section IV-D). In this case, this means ensuring the suppliers
can be proﬁtable in the market so that they are incentivized to
enter it in the ﬁrst place. Furthermore, while the mechanism has
to be individually rational, our global objective is to achieve
the most efﬁcient outcome (task allocation) that we can. Now,
as we discussed in Section III, this is equivalent to ﬁnding
the allocation that minimizes total cost. In a typical CDA
mechanism, the optimal task allocation occurs when the total
proﬁt of all buyers and all sellers is maximized [43] and this
occurs when the combined cost of sellers is minimized on
the sell side,10 as the sellers with the lowest cost would be
successful.
However, given our additional constraints of limited capacity
and a startup cost, the seller’s strategic behavior would be more
complex than that of the buyer, since, as we mention before, it
additionally has to strategize over the quantity it is expected to
sell. In this context, we cannot achieve full efﬁciency because
no agent has complete information about every other agent in
the market (unlike in Section IV where the center is aware
of everyone’s cost functions and capacities) and the sellers do
not have increasing marginal costs which would guarantee an
equilibrium price for trade [25].
Given this, our aim is to design a protocol that achieves
a level of efﬁciency that is reasonably close to the optimal
solution given by our centralized mechanism. To do this, we
now outline our protocol, and then go on to compare its
performance with its centralized counterpart in terms of task
allocation efﬁciency.
A. Mechanism
The protocol we propose is a variant of the multiunit CDA.
Buyers and sellers can submit offers to buy and sell multiple
9In fact, in CDA scenarios demand cannot be known even after the bids have
been submitted [6]. This is why sellers try to predict the demand in order to be
more proﬁtable [19].
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TABLE II
MULTIUNIT CDA ORDER BOOK—BEFORE CLEARING
units of the resource, respectively, and those orders are queued
in an order book which is cleared continuously (with additional
constraints as a result of buyers’ inelastic demands). The proto-
col proceeds as follows.
1) Buyer i submits an offer, bid(q,p,i), to buy exactly q
(q ≥ 1) units of the good at the unit price p. The utility
of buyer i for a quantity other than q is 0.
2) Conversely, supplier Sj submits an offer, ask(q,p,j),t o
sell a maximum of q (q ≥ 1) units at unit price p.
3) These bids and asks are queued in an orderbook, which is
a publicly observable board listing all the bids and asks
submitted to the market (see Table II). The bids in the
order book are sorted in decreasing order of price and the
asks are in increasing order (higher bids and lower asks
are more likely to result in transactions).
4) The clearing rule in the market is as follows. Whenever a
newbidoraskissubmitted,anattemptismadeatclearing
the order book. The orderbook is cleared whenever a
transaction can occur (that is, when the lowest asking
price is higher than the highest bidding price and any
bidding offer can be cleared completely and the bidding
quantity for each offer is completely satisﬁed by the
supply to be cleared). The transaction price is set at the
bidding price which we experimentally ﬁnd to result in
the total market proﬁts being equally divided between the
sell side and the buy side11 [43].
To further illustrate this process, we present a graphical
representation of the clearing rule in Fig. 2. As can be seen,
the offers queued in the orderbook are used to build demand
and supply curves. All bids with a unit price lower than the
lowest unit ask price and, similarly, all asks with a unit price
higher than the highest unit bid price, cannot result in any
transactionandarenotrepresentedintheﬁgure.Thetransaction
price and quantity are clearly shown in the ﬁgure (2.75 and
70, respectively), as the point where the demand curve crosses
the supply curve under the additional constraint that bid offers
are not divisible. At this transaction price, the total proﬁt of all
buyersandsellersthattransactismaximizedwithallconstraints
speciﬁed by our protocols satisﬁed. The orderbook in Table II
can thus be cleared as shown in Fig. 2 resulting in the new
11We chose this option because a mechanism where most of the proﬁts in the
market were distributed among sellers would be less appealing to buyers than
one where a larger share of proﬁts were distributed among buyers. Thus, with
a similar preference among sellers (who will join a market where more proﬁt
is distributed among the sell side), a mechanism that equally distributes market
proﬁts among the buy and sell side is the rational preference for both buyers
and sellers.
Fig. 2. Panel (a) shows the demand and supply (curves) of the order book,
with the shaded region representing allocations. Panel (b) points out the
clearable bids and asks in the order book [shaded area in panel (a)].
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orderbookgiveninTableIII.Themarketclearingisthensimilar
to solving an optimization problem where the objective is to
maximize the total proﬁt of buyers and sellers that will transact
given that cleared demand must be equal to cleared supply and
no partial clearing of bid is allowed.12
Now, in order to compare the efﬁciency of this protocol with
that of the centralized mechanism, we assume that the buyers
have high limit prices (this represents price inelasticity because
buyers are willing to pay any price to acquire the goods and is
equal to an arbitrary maximum price that a bid or an ask can
be submitted at). Furthermore, we adopt the approach of Gode
and Sunder [18] in employing a ZI2 strategy in order to ﬁnd
the underlying efﬁciency of our market. To this end, we next
12We note that other clearing rules are also possible, for example to max-
imize the number of transactions or to maximize proﬁts of the sellers only.
However, the aim of a market mechanism is to maximize social welfare by
maximizing the total proﬁt extracted in the market, and it is achieved through
the simple ordering order books that publicly shows which buyers (with highest
valuation of the goods) can transact with which suppliers (with the lowest
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present the ZI2 that is tailored to the bidding structure of our
CDA protocol, before we detail the actual evaluation.
B. ZI2 Strategy
One of the principal concerns in developing a market mech-
anism is to ensure that it is efﬁcient even when the participants
adopt a simple strategic behavior. The underlying intuition here
is that by considering such behavior, we are able to establish
a lower bound on the efﬁciency of the mechanism and we
can consider the extent to which the market mechanism itself
affects the efﬁciency of the market. Thus, the ZI strategy [18] is
widely used for this purpose since it is not motivated by trading
proﬁt and effectively ignores the state of the market and past
experience when forming a bid or an ask. It simply draws its
offer price from a uniform distribution over a given range.
Since in our mechanism, the asks consist of price and
quantity, we extend the ZI strategy to our ZI2 strategy that
randomizes over both price and quantity. As discussed earlier,
any sophisticated strategy, on the sell side, would make some
form of prediction on the number of units it is likely to sell as
part of its price formation process (because information about
the actual demand is not available and there is uncertainty as to
whether the agent is more competitive than the other participat-
ing suppliers). Our ZI2 supplier j, instead, randomizes over the
expected transaction quantity to form a limit price  j which is
used as in the original ZI strategy. Thus, the ZI2 strategy are as
follows.13
1) For buyer i
pi ∼U(0,  i)
offer = bid(qi,p i,i). (10)
2) For seller j
  qj ∼U(0,c j)
 j =( fj +   qjuj)/  qj
pj ∼U( j,max)
offer = ask(cj,p j,j). (11)
Buyers are endowed with high limit prices at the beginning
of the auction (because they have inelastic demand), while
sellers are endowed with their cost functions and capacities
(collectively referred to as the production function). Buyer i
submits offers to buy the quantity qi it requires at a unit price
drawn from a uniform distribution ranging from 0 to its limit
price  i [see (10)]. Conversely, seller j submits an ask between
its limit price and max as per (11), where cj is its production
capacity, fj is its startup cost, and uj is its marginal cost.
C. Empirical Evaluation of the Mechanism
In order to perform empirical evaluations, we have developed
an implementation of this distributed mechanism based on the
13X ∼U(A,B) describes a discrete uniform distribution between A and B,
with steps of 0.01.
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protocol and strategies described here.14 As the experimental
setup, we ran the simulations over 2000 rounds15 for two
different markets, more speciﬁcally a small market with three
buyers and three sellers (market A) and a larger market with
15 buyers and 15 sellers (market B). We consider both the small
and large markets so as to demonstrate the scaleability of our
mechanism.
In each market, each seller was given a production function
(supply for market A is given in Table I), while each buyer was
required to procure an exact quantity of units with a relatively
high limit price. We ran different simulations for each market,
with different total demands ranging from 1 to the maximum
productionquantity.ThetotaldemandD wasdistributedamong
the buyers (see Table IV for the demand in market A, where
D =Σ iqi, D ∈ [1,425] given the sellers’ production functions
in Table I). Thus, the total demand in market A was varied from
1 to 425 (the maximum supply quantity of market A), while in
market B the total demand ranged from 1 to 2400.
In order to empirically evaluate the efﬁciency of the mech-
anism, in terms of minimizing the total cost of production,
we measure this property and compare it to the optimal so-
lution found in the centralized mechanism. Given each total
demand, the mean efﬁciency of the market (averaged over 2000
independent rounds) is shown in Fig. 4, where the optimal
production cost is normalized to 1, while the total production
cost of the centralized and the decentralized mechanisms are
shown in Fig. 3. As can be seen, the mechanism is efﬁcient
with an average efﬁciency of 83% (and a minimum efﬁciency
of 53% when demand is relatively low) for the market B and an
average efﬁciency of 86% (and a minimum efﬁciency of 67%)
formarketA.Inbothcases,theminimumefﬁciency caseoccurs
when the demand is split among many more suppliers than are
actually needed (with respect to the optimal allocation). This
increases the overall cost of supply as a result of the ﬁxed cost
of the extraneous suppliers. However, in the typical CDA, the
worstcaseanalysisconsiderstheaverageefﬁciencyofZIagents
[18]. This is because, although it is theoretically possible for
an allocation of very low efﬁciency to occur, in almost every
run (higher than 99% of the time), the CDA implemented with
agents employing the ZI strategy has a high efﬁciency. Thus, it
is the ZI2 nature of the strategy which provides a lower bound
on measuring efﬁciency and, we expect the average efﬁciency
with a more informed strategy to be better [6], [19], [43].
We, therefore, adopt this approach in discussing the inherent
efﬁciency of our CDA mechanism.
14Available at http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~pv03r/simulator.
15The results were validated using a students t-test with two samples of 2000
runs, assuming equal variance with means µ1 =0 .7198 and µ2 =0 .7218 and
p-value p =0 .3660. This means that the difference between the means is not
signiﬁcant.402 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS—PART A: SYSTEMS AND HUMANS, VOL. 37, NO. 3, MAY 2007
Fig. 3. Optimal and CDA production cost. (a) Three buyers and three sellers and (b) 15 buyers and 15 sellers.
Fig. 4. Average market efﬁciency. (a) Three buyers and three sellers and (b) 15 buyers and 15 sellers.
In the experiments with each market, we observe an in-
creasing trend whereby the market efﬁciency increases as total
demand approaches the maximum capacity of the sellers (see
Fig. 4). It can also be seen that there is a high variance when
the total demand is relatively low. Considering, speciﬁcally,
the set of experiments with market A, the intuitions behind
these observations are as follows. The variance of the market
efﬁciencyisgenerallyhigherwhenthetotaldemandislow.This
is because the optimal allocation for a total demand of 100 is
completely covered by seller 1 (with a marginal cost of 1.5 and
astartupcostof100).However,ourmarketmechanismdoesnot
ensure that only seller 1 will trade and, thus, sellers 2 and 3 may
also be part of this allocation for the total demand of 100. The
high variance is principally an artifact of the additional startup
costs if more than one seller were to trade. As the total demand
increases past 175, the optimal allocation is covered by at least
two sellers. Again, the variance past the demand of 175 is the
result of sellers supplying different numbers of units at different
marginal costs, with at most one additional startup cost. When
the total demand is very high, close to the total capacity, all the
sellers participate in the allocation, and the small variance is
solely due to the sellers providing different numbers of units
(a difference which is relatively low compared to the total
startup cost). The observations in the set of experiments with
market B can also be explained by the same reasoning, with the
higher variance occurring when demand that can be covered by
a single seller is distributed among multiple sellers.
Furthermore, we can explain the increasing trend of the mar-
ket efﬁciency seen in Fig. 3. Considering market A, a demand
of up to 175 can be provided by only 1 seller. The jumps in
Fig. 3 correspond to the optimal allocation changing between
a combination of one to three sellers. For example, jumps at
100 and 150 correspond to the optimal allocation starting with
seller 1, changing to seller 2 and ﬁnally to seller 3. The increaseDASH et al.: MARKET-BASED TASK ALLOCATION MECHANISMS FOR LIMITED-CAPACITY SUPPLIERS 403
Fig. 5. Sellers’ total proﬁt given different demands for market A with three
buyers and three sellers and market B with 15 buyers and 15 sellers.
in efﬁciency as total demand increases is the result of the
number of sellers involved in the optimal allocation, changing
from a single seller (up to a total demand of 175) to three sellers
(past a total demand of 325 which is the highest demand any
two sellers can cover). However, in our market, any number of
sellers can trade at any time. Thus, as total demand increases,
the loss in efﬁciency that arises from the extra startup costs
(compared to the optimal allocation) decreases which in turn
explains the generally increasing trend. In the simulations
with market B, a similar trend can be observed, with a lower
efﬁciency when demand is lower than the minimum sellers’
capacity (210). As in market A, there are more inefﬁcient
allocations that can arise when demand is low (and can be
satisﬁed by a single seller), which would decrease the average
efﬁciency much more than it would given a smaller number of
inefﬁcient allocations. Here, we use the same reasoning as in
marketAtoexplainthejumps,whicharelargerinnumbergiven
the larger number of participants.
As well as being efﬁcient, the simulation results in Fig. 5
show that, broadly the sellers and buyers do indeed equally
share the market proﬁts (the ratio of sellers’ proﬁts to total
market proﬁt is approximately equal to 0.5 in both cases. This
fair division of proﬁts arises from the design of the clearing rule
(see Section V-A). This is important because this proﬁtability
means that the agents are incentivized to enter the market
which means our distributed mechanism can be viewed as being
individually rational.
Having analyzed two different markets (A + B) in detail,
we now examine how the efﬁciency of our mechanism scales
up over different markets (see Fig. 6). In order to do so, we
ﬁnd the average efﬁciency of markets as the number of buyers
and the number of sellers are, respectively, varied from two16
to 20. We run the auctions over 500 iterations with sellers
16A minimum of two sellers and two buyers is required for a double auction.
Fig. 6. Performance of decentralized mechanism in different markets with
different number of buyers and sellers.
randomly allocated their supply and buyers having a demand
ranging from 1 up to the total supply divided by number of
buyers. As can be seen, the average efﬁciency of the mechanism
is maintained as the size of the market increases. The average
efﬁciency ranges between 0.64 and 0.89 with no correlation to
the market size,17 which implies that it is unaffected by the size
of the market, i.e., the market scales.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented work on the development
of two complementary mechanisms for task allocation. We
considered a scenario where production costs are characterized
by a cost function composed of a ﬁxed cost, a constant marginal
cost, and a limited capacity and where we were seeking the
minimal total production cost that satisﬁes demand.
Speciﬁcally, in the ﬁrst mechanism, we extend the standard
VCG mechanism to our problem domain in order to incentivize
selﬁsh agents to report truthfully about their types and thereby
enabling the mechanism to ﬁnd the efﬁcient allocation. This
required a novel penalty scheme to ensure that the mechanism
is strategy-proof for agents misreporting both their cost and
their capacities. Individual rationality is conserved under this
new mechanism, and we show how this mechanism is robust to
uncertainties in the capacities of the agents. We then presented
a dynamic programming algorithm, which solves the task allo-
cation problem of the center in pseudopolynomial time.
In the second mechanism, we extend the standard format of a
CDA so as to develop a decentralized mechanism for resource
allocation in the same context. We ﬁnd that this mechanism has
a high inherent average efﬁciency (over 86% in the examples
we study) by testing it with a variant of the ZI strategy.
When taken together, we ﬁnd that these mechanisms repre-
sent a tradeoff in terms of efﬁciency and the decentralization
of a mechanism (in the examples we consider, the loss in
efﬁciency can range from 0% to 50% depending on the demand
and number of buyers and sellers in the market). However,
both mechanisms still ensure that the participants derive a proﬁt
17The correlation between average efﬁciency and number of sellers is 0.1 and
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by joining the mechanism, thereby justifying their use with
selﬁsh agents.
As future work, we ﬁrst intend to extend these mechanisms
todealwithiteratedallocations (i.e.,onesinwhichnewdemand
continuously appears) since in several of the cases we consider
it is conceivable that the agents can observe and learn about
the behaviors of other agents in the system. Our centralized
mechanism would still work in such situations if we consider
myopicagents(i.e.,agentsthatcannot strategizeovermorethan
one round of allocation [29]) since then these agents will not
strategize over rounds. However, this assumption might be too
restrictive in some settings. Also, we wish to further investigate
the link between task allocation protocols which are efﬁcient
and those that are robust (i.e., protocols in which it is highly
likely that agents will fulﬁll their assigned task despite being
uncertain about their capabilities when revealing their type).
The link has been revealed here via the penalty scheme and the
connection of the penalty scheme to a trust-based scheme has
been discussed. However, a deeper study is required to formally
establish the consequence of requiring robust mechanisms on
the efﬁciency of the resultant mechanism. We believe that
the hybrid approach combining trust and penalties would be
a very interesting ﬁeld to pursue. Finally, we aim to develop
more sophisticated strategies for the decentralized mechanism
in order to enhance the efﬁciency of the system, while ensuring
that these sophisticated strategies derive higher proﬁt than their
simpler counterparts. This has been shown to be achievable in
simple CDAs [6], [17], [43], and we believe it is also achievable
in our modiﬁed CDA protocol. Such developments will enable
us to more effectively ﬁnd the set of agents who can perform
the required task at the lowest cost (i.e., the efﬁciency will be
increased).
APPENDIX
A TBM would differ from the current scheme in two main
respects.18
1) An agent i would report an extra dimension repi which is
its self-reputation that determines how often it succeeds
in providing up to its reported capacity ci.
2) The center determines the optimal allocation K∗ from
the reports of the agents (ui,f i,c i,repi), whereby the
feasible allocation is determined by a combination of repi
and ci.
It is interesting to note that as a result of the way the
payments are conditioned in the TBM, a penalty would still
be applied if the agent does not produce its capacity but the
penalty is not the same. In TBM, there is no incentive for
an agent which has been overoptimistic of its capacity to
produce the maximum it can. Also, TBM does not consider the
case when the pdf from which the (expected) capacity of the
agent is determined changes (e.g., seasonal changes affecting
the capacity of a solar generator, or failures in components
of a machine reducing the capacity of a job-shop machine).
However, an interesting hybrid approach would be to have a
18We, here, consider the simpliﬁcation of TBM in which agents report about
their own reputation. This is similar to the mechanism developed in [30].
speciﬁc δi conditioned on the reputation of each agent i.T h i s
would provide us the ability to condition the penalty of an agent
dependent upon its past performance and not just its present
performance. The investigation of such a mechanism is outside
the scope of this paper and is left for future work.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for
their comments which improved this paper.
REFERENCES
[1] C. Boutilier, “Multiagent systems: Challenges and opportunities for
decision-theoretic planning,” AI Mag., vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 35–43, 1999.
[2] E. Adar, B. Huberman. (2000, Oct.). Free riding on Gnutella.
First Monday. [Online]. 5(10). Available: http://www.ﬁrstmonday.org/
issues/issues5_10/adar/
[3] G. R. Bitran and H. H. Yanasse, “Computational complexity of the capac-
itated lot size problem,” Alfred P. Sloan Sch. Manag., Massachusetts Inst.
Technol., Cambridge, Tech. Rep. Sloan WP No. 1271-81, 1981.
[4] J. Bredin, D. Kotz, and D. Rus, “Market-based resource control for
mobile agents,” in Proc. 2nd Int. Conf. Auton. Agents (Agents), 1998,
pp. 197–204.
[5] S. Clearwater, Ed., Market-Based Control—A Paradigm for Distributed
Resource Allocation. Singapore:World Scientiﬁc, 1996.
[6] D. Cliff, J. Bruten, “Minimal-intelligence agents for bargaining behav-
iors in market-based environments,” Hewlett Packard Labs, Bristol, U.K.,
Tech. Rep. HPL-97-91, 1997.
[7] S. E. Conry, K. Kuwabara, V. R. Lesser, and R. A. Meyer, “Multistage
negotiation for distributed constraint satisfaction,” IEEE Trans. Syst.,
Man, Cybern., vol. 21, no. 6, pp. 1462–1477, Nov./Dec. 1991.
[8] R. K. Dash, D. C. Parkes, and N. R. Jennings, “Computational mechanism
design: A call to arms,” IEEE Intell. Syst., vol. 18, no. 6, pp. 40–47,
Nov./Dec. 2003.
[9] R. K. Dash, S. Ramchurn, and N. R. Jennings, “Trust-based mechanism
design,” in Proc. 3rd Int. Conf. Auton. Agents and Multi-Agent Syst.,
New York, 2004, pp. 726–753.
[10] E. H. Durfee and V. Lesser, “Negotiating task decomposition and alloca-
tion using partial global planning,” in Distributed Artiﬁcial Intelligence,
vol. II, L. Gasser and M. Huhns, Eds. London, U.K.: Pitman, 1989,
pp. 229–244.
[11] M. Eso, S. Ghosh, J. R. Kalagnanam, and L. Ladanyi, “Bid evaluation
in procurement auctions with piecewise linear supply curves,” IBM Res.,
Yorktown Heights, NY, Tech. Rep. RC 22219, 2001. 10598.
[12] M. Florian, J. K. Lenstra, and H. G. Rinnooy Kan, “Deterministic produc-
tion planning: Algorithms and complexity,” Manage. Sci., vol. 26, no. 7,
pp. 669–679, 1980.
[13] D. Friedman and J. Rust, Eds., The Double Auction Market: Institutions,
Theories and Evidence. New York: Addison-Wesley, 1992.
[14] M. R. Garey and D. S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability—A Guide
to the Theory of NP-Completeness. San Francisco, CA: Freeman, 1979.
[15] B. P. Gerkey and M. J. Mataric, “Sold!: Auction methods for multi-robot
coordination,” IEEE Trans. Robot. Autom., vol. 18, no. 5, pp. 758–768,
Oct. 2002.
[16] A. Giovannucci, J. A. Rodríguez-Aguilar, A. Reyes-Moro, F. X. Noria,
and J. Cerquides, “Towards automated procurement via agent-aware sup-
port,” in Proc. 3rd Int. Conf. Auton. Agents and Multi-Agent Syst.,
New York, 2004, pp. 244–251.
[17] S. Gjerstad and J. Dickhaut, “Price formation in double auctions,” Games
Econ. Behav., vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 1–29, Jan. 1998.
[18] D. K. Gode and S. Sunder, “Allocative efﬁciency of markets with
zero-intelligence traders: Market as a partial substitute for individual
rationality,” J. Polit. Econ., vol. 101, no. 1, pp. 119–137, 1993.
[19] M. He, H. F. Leung, and N. R. Jennings, “A fuzzy logic based bidding
strategy for autonomous agents in continuous double auctions,” IEEE
Trans. Knowl. Data Eng., vol. 15, no. 6, pp. 1345–1363, Nov./Dec. 2003.
[20] N. R. Jennings and S. Bussmann, “Agent-based control systems,” IEEE
Control Syst. Mag., vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 61–73, Jun. 2003.
[21] A. Kothari, D. C. Parkes, and S. Suri, “Approximately-strategyproof
and tractable multi-unit auctions,” in Proc. 4th ACM Conf. EC, 2003,
pp. 166–175.
[22] V. Krishna, Auction Theory. New York: Academic, 2002.DASH et al.: MARKET-BASED TASK ALLOCATION MECHANISMS FOR LIMITED-CAPACITY SUPPLIERS 405
[23] V. R. Lesser and D. D. Corkill, “Functionally accurate, cooperative dis-
tributed systems,” IEEE Trans. Syst., Man, Cybern., vol. SMC-11, no. 1,
pp. 81–96, Jan. 1981.
[24] S. Martello and P. Toth, Knapsack Problems, Algorithms and Computer
Implementations. Chichester, U.K.: Wiley, 1990.
[25] A. MasColell, M. Whinston, and J. Green, Microeconomic Theory.
London, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995.
[26] K. A. McCabe, S. J. Rassenti, and V. L. Smith, “Designing call auc-
tion institution: Is double dutch the best?” Econ. J., vol. 102, no. 410,
pp. 9–23, 1992.
[27] J. Nicolaisen, V. Petrov, and L. Tesfatsion, “Market power and efﬁ-
ciency in a computational electricity market with discriminatory double-
auction pricing,” IEEE Trans. Evol. Comput., vol. 5, no. 5, pp. 504–523,
Oct. 2001.
[28] C. H. Papadimitriou and K. Steiglitz, Combinatorial Optimization:
Algorithms and Complexity. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1982.
[29] D. Parkes, “Iterative combinatorial auctions: Achieving economic
and computational efﬁciency,” Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, PA, May 2001.
[30] R. Porter, A. Ronen, Y. Shoham, and M. Tennenholtz, “Mechanism design
with execution uncertainty,” in Proc. UAI, 2002, pp. 414–421.
[31] K. Ramamritham, J. A. Stankovic, and W. Zhao, “Distributed scheduling
of tasks with deadlines and resource requirements,” IEEE Trans. Comput.,
vol. 38, no. 8, pp. 1110–1123, Aug. 1989.
[32] A. Ronen, “Solving optimisation problems among selﬁsh players,” Ph.D.
dissertation, Inst. Comput. Sci., Hebrew Univ. Jerusalem, Jerusalem,
Israel, 2000.
[33] J. Rosenschein and G. Zlotkin, Rules of Encounter. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1994.
[34] A. E. R. Roth and I. Erev, “Learning in extensive form games: Ex-
perimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term,”
Games Econ. Behav., vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 164–212, 1995.
[35] M. H. Rothkopf, A. Pekec, and R. M. Harstad, “Computationally manage-
able combinatorial auctions,” Manage. Sci., vol. 44, no. 8, pp. 1131–1147,
1998.
[36] S. Russell and P. Norvig, Artiﬁcial Intelligence: A Modern Approach.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995.
[37] T. Sandholm, “Emediator: A next generation electronic commerce
server,” Comput. Intell., vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 656–676, 2002.
[38] T. Sandholm, “Making markets and democracy work: A story of incen-
tives and computing,” in Proc. 18th IJCAI, 2003, pp. 1649–1671.
[39] J. Shneidman and D. Parkes, “Rationality and self-interest in peer to peer
networks,” in Proc. 2nd IPTPS, 2003, pp. 139–148.
[40] V. L. Smith, “An experimental study of competitive market behaviour,”
J. Polit. Econ., vol. 70, no. 2, pp. 111–137, Apr. 1962.
[41] M. Tennenholtz, “Some tractable combinatorial auctions,” in Proc. 17th
Nat. Conf. Artif. Intell. (AAAI/IAAI), 2000, pp. 98–103.
[42] G. Tesauro and J. L. Bredin, “Strategic sequential bidding in auctions
using dynamic programming,” in Proc. 1st Int. Joint Conf. AAMAS, 2002,
pp. 591–598.
[43] P. Vytelingum, R. K. Dash, E. David, and N. R. Jennings, “A risk-based
bidding strategy for continuous double auctions,” in Proc. 16th ECAI,
2004, pp. 79–83.
[44] R. Wolski, J. S. Plank, J. Brevik, and T. Bryan, “Analyzing market-based
resource allocation strategies for the computational Grid,” Int. J. High
Perform. Comput. Appl., vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 258–281, Fall 2001.
[45] M. Xia, J. Stallaert, and A. Whinston, “Solving the combinatorial double
auction problem,” Eur. J. Oper. Res., vol. 164, no. 1, pp. 239–251, 2004.
[46] M. Yokoo, E. H. Durfee, T. Ishida, and K. Kuwabara, “Distributed con-
straint satisfaction problems: Formalization and algorithms,” IEEE Trans.
Knowl. Data Eng., vol. 10, no. 5, pp. 673–685, Sep./Oct. 1998.
Rajdeep K. Dash received the M.Eng. degree (ﬁrst-
class honors) in electrical and electronic engineering
from Imperial College London, London, and the
Ph.D. degree in computer science from the Univer-
sity of Southampton, Southampton, U.K.
He is currently a Research Fellow in the IAM
Group, University of Southampton. His main re-
search interest includes the use of game theory and
mechanism design for the control of distributed mul-
tiagent systems.
Perukrishnen Vytelingum received the M.Eng. de-
gree in information systems engineering (ﬁrst-class
honors) from Imperial College London, London,
U.K., and the Ph.D. degree in computer science from
the University of Southampton, Southampton, U.K.
He is currently a Research Fellow in the IAM
Group, University of Southampton. His main inter-
ests include the continuous double auction, strategies
formarket-basedcontrol,tradingagentcompetitions,
and decentralized multiagent systems.
Mr. Vytelingum received the Eurothern Project
Prize from the Imperial College London.
Alex Rogers received the B.Sc. degree (honors) in
physics from the University of Durham, Durham,
U.K., and the Ph.D. degree in computer science from
the University of Southampton, Southampton, U.K.
Having previously worked at EuroBios applying
complexity science to business problems, he is cur-
rently a Lecturer within the IAM Group with the
University of Southampton. His current research in-
terests are developing decentralized algorithms to
control open agent-based systems.
Esther David received the B.Sc. degree in mathe-
matics and computer science, the M.Sc. degree in
computer science, and the Ph.D. degree in computer
science from Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel.
She is currently a Senior Research Fellow
in the IAM Group, University of Southampton,
Southampton, U.K. Her current research interests are
developing decentralized algorithms to control open
agent-based systems as automated auction protocols.
Nicholas R. Jennings received the B.Sc. degree
(honors) in computer science from Exeter University,
Exeter, U.K., and the Ph.D. degree in artiﬁcial intel-
ligence from the University of London (Queen Mary
College), London, U.K.
He is currently a Professor of computer science
in the School of Electronics and Computer Science,
Southampton University, Southampton, U.K., where
he carries out basic and applied research in agent-
based computing. He is Deputy Head of School
(Research), Head of the IAM Group, and is also the
Chief Scientiﬁc Ofﬁcer for Lost Wax. He helped pioneer the use of agent-
based techniques for real-world applications and has also made theoretical
contributions in the areas of automated negotiation and auctions, cooperative
problem solving, and agent-oriented software engineering. He has published
some 200 papers on various facets of agent-based computing, and is in the top
100 most cited computer scientists (according to the CiteSeer digital library).
Dr. Jennings has won several awards for his research, including the Com-
puters and Thought Award (1999), an Institution of Electrical Engineers
Achievement Medal (2000), and the Association for Computing Machinery
Autonomous Agents Research Award (2003).